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Abstract
Decision processes among couples depend on the balance of power between
the partners, determining the welfare of household members as well as household
outcomes. However, little is known about the determinants of power. The col-
lective model of household behavior gives an operational deﬁnition of decision
power. We argue that important aspects of this concept of power are measurable
through self-assessments of partners’ say. Using such a measure, we model bal-
ance of power as an outcome of the interplay between both partners’ demographic,
socioeconomic, and health characteristics. Advancing ﬂexible, yet parsimonious
empirical models is crucial for the analysis, as both absolute status as well as
relative position in the couple might potentially aﬀect the balance of power, and
gender-asymmetries may be important. Appropriately, we advance semiparamet-
ric double index models that feature one separate index for each spouse, which
interact nonparametrically in the determination of power.
Based on data from the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS), we ﬁnd educa-
tion and employment status to be associated with more individual decision power,
especially for women. Moreover, health and income have independent eﬀects on
the distribution of power. We also show that contextual factors are important
determinants of decision power, with women in urban couples featuring more de-
cision power than their rural counterparts.
Keywords: Family Economics, Intra-household bargaining, semiparamet-
ric methods, multiple index models
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11 Introduction
Since the 1980s, economists have tried to better understand decision processes
within the household. The interest mainly arose because of concerns that the in-
dividual welfare of some household members, especially children, might be lower
than average household welfare. Intrahousehold decision processes are not explic-
itly captured in the traditional unitary model, in which the aggregate behavior
of the household is assumed to mimic that of a single agent. In consequence,
new models of household decision-making have been developed. They posit that
household members bargain over household outcomes. One of these models is
the collective model, which assumes Pareto eﬃciency of bargaining outcomes.
In this model, the household’s utility function can be represented as a weighted
sum of individual utilities. The weights attached to each partner can thereby be
interpreted as their relative decision power.
Identifying which individual characteristics are the driving forces behind deci-
sion power is the main objective of this paper. A better understanding of these
determinants can help address inequality within households and design targeted
policies to promote gender empowerment.
Yet, disentangling individual preferences and power has proven to be diﬃcult, as
typically studied family outcomes reﬂect a blending of both. To unravel decision
power from the confounding eﬀects of preferences, we propose the use of a direct
survey measure of decision power. Speciﬁcally, we exploit self-assessments of say
in important family decisions as provided by both partners in the couple. Our
measures directly aim at the overall balance of power, thus avoiding the inter-
action between preferences and decision power that generally confounds studies
of particular family outcomes. The feature that our measure is not framed to
speciﬁc family decisions motivates its interpretation as an ordinal measure for
the (unobservable) Pareto weight.
The allocation of decision power in a couple is the result of (strategic) interactions
between the partners. The nature of these interactions is thereby inﬂuenced by
individual, household and societal characteristics, which in turn determine each
partner’s outside options as well as traditional gender roles on which the part-
nership is based. For example, factors like age, education, health or income may
play a vital role in deﬁning the partners well-being in case of marriage break-
down, and thus aﬀect decision power by shifting their respective participation
constraints. Similarly, contextual factors, such as traditional gender roles and
social pressure, may also aﬀect the cost of marriage breakdown and thus inﬂu-
ence the allocation of decision power within the couple. As a consequence, it
appears that individual power is driven by numerous individual and household
characteristics as well as societal factors whose interplay between partners deter-
mines the ﬁnal allocation of power within the couple. Reﬂecting this structure of
the allocation process, we assume that we can aggregate each partners enabling
factors into one-dimensional indices, whose interaction determines the degree of
2gender equality within the couple.
The relationship between these indices and the ﬁnal allocation of decision power
may thereby be hard to characterize ex ante. On the one hand, we would clearly
suspect superior individual characteristics to be associated with better outside
options, such that these should manifest themselves in higher reservation utilities
(and thus higher bargaining power) as well as more decision power within the
family. On the other hand, as decision power is a couple’s outcome, it is also
clear that we need to consider both partners jointly when studying its allocation.
For example, a person with relatively favorable characteristics may nonetheless
not have very much say in the couple’s decisions if he or she is living with an
even more privileged partner. The latter consideration seems especially impor-
tant, since marriage markets tend to feature positive assortative matching, such
that important partner characteristics like education or income tend to be posi-
tively correlated within couples. In general, the ﬁnal allocation of decision power
should depend on both absolute and relative levels of empowerment of the two
partners, and economic theory gives us little guidance on either their relative im-
portance or how to model their respective eﬀects in a parsimonious, yet ﬂexible
econometric framework.
We suggest the use of semiparametric multiple index models as well-suited tools
for the analysis of decisions involving multiple decision-makers. As explained in
greater detail below, this class of models readily incorporates the potential eﬀects
of both absolute and relative levels of partners’ characteristics as well as their
interactions. We can also obtain simple bargaining power indices in the course of
estimating such models. These indices aggregate numerous individual, household
and contextual factors into a one-dimensional bargaining power measure for each
partner. The respective aggregation weights are obtained endogenously by ﬁtting
the models to direct self-assessments of the distribution of decision power within
the household.
Based on data from the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS) of 2003, we
ﬁnd education, income and working for pay to be associated with higher levels of
decision power for the respective partner, with stronger eﬀects for women than for
men. Also, women in cities tend to have somewhat more say in important family
decisions than their respective counterparts in rural areas. Moreover, the mod-
els feature some interesting gender asymmetries and non-monotonicities, which
would have been hard to capture in a fully parametric modelling framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives some back-
ground based on the theoretical and empirical literature on intra-household al-
location and household bargaining, further motivates this paper and speciﬁes its
contribution. The data is delineated in Section 3, followed by a description of our
semiparametric modelling framework in Section 4. The results of our empirical
analysis are recorded in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
32 Background
2.1 Theoretical models of household behavior
Unitary versus bargaining models of household behavior
Until the 1980s, researchers treated households as if they mimicked the behav-
ior of a single agent. In this unitary model of household behavior, income is
pooled across household members so that household outcomes, like the demand
for goods, depend only on total income and not on its distribution across house-
hold members. Yet, important implications of the unitary model, such as income
pooling, are usually rejected on micro data, which casts some doubt on its actual
validity (see, e.g., Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) and Thomas (1990)).
Only in the 1980s, economists have become interested in decision processes within
households. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) pioneered
modelling household decisions as a bargaining process between partners, which
interact strategically in determining household outcomes. These studies have
triggered the evolution of new types of household decision models, cooperative
(or collective)1 and non-cooperative2 ones. In noncooperative models, outcomes
are generally ineﬃcient, implying that household members who know each other
well and make joint decisions every day leave Pareto gains unexploited on a con-
stant basis. This feature is sometimes regarded as implausible in a traditional
family setup.3 Collective models, on the contrary, assume pareto-eﬃcient house-
hold outcomes, but are very general otherwise. Particularly, they do not restrict
attention to any speciﬁc form of bargaining between the partners. Given Pareto
eﬃciency, the household utility function can be expressed as a weighted sum of
the individual utility functions of male and female:4
Uhousehold = ¹ ¢ Umale + (1 ¡ ¹) ¢ Ufemale (1)
where ¹ is the Pareto weight of the male partner.
Decision power and its determinants in the collective model
The collective framework provides an operational deﬁnition of each partner’s
decision power. Particularly, characterizing household utility as in equation (1),
we can interpret the Pareto weight ¹ as a measure of power of the male relative
to the female partner. On the one hand, it is clear from equation (1) that ¹
depends on the particular cardinal representation of Umale and Ufemale, and can
therefore not be identiﬁed for the usual characterization of preferences based
on ordinal utility functions. Despite these cardinality issues, it is clear that -
1e.g. Apps and Rees (1988), Chiappori (1988), Blundell et al. (2002), Blundell et al. (2005)
2e.g. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Browning et al. (2006)
3It might be more plausible in large, very infrequent decision situations, e.g. moving or
fertility choices, or in joint decisions about their children by separated or divorced parents.
4For a detailed discussion see Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2007).
4conditional on any ﬁxed cardinalization of Umale and Ufemale - higher levels of ¹
imply that the male partner’s preferences become relatively more important for
household utility. As a consequence, the male partner becomes more "decisive" in
the determination of optimal household decisions based on maximizing (1), and
will therefore enjoy relatively better outcomes ceteris paribus. This point is easily
illustrated by considering the extreme cases: If ¹ equals one (zero), the household
utility function in (1) solely reﬂects the male (female) partner’s preferences, and
he (she) acts as a dictator.
While the Pareto weight is ﬁxed in the unitary model, it can be generalized in
the collective model to be a function
¹ = ¹(p;y;x;z) (2)
of prices p, incomes y, individual characteristics x and so-called distribution fac-
tors z. Characteristics are deﬁned as distribution factors if they neither aﬀect
preferences nor budget constraints, but inﬂuence household decisions through
their impact on the Pareto weight only. From an empirical point of view, their
exclusion from both preferences and the budget constraint greatly facilitates an
assessment of their respective impact on decision power based on outcome data
alone. Examples for such distribution factors include relative ages or education
levels, institutional variables aﬀecting the cost of marriage breakdown, social
norms or traditional roles. Note also that individual incomes represent a distri-
bution factor, as the budget constraint depends on total income only. Condi-
tional on total income, individual income contributions solely aﬀect the couples’
resource allocation through their impact on the Pareto weight.
On the other hand, the eﬀects of prices and total income on decision power are
less straightforward to study based on household outcome data alone, as they
aﬀect both the budget set and the Pareto weight simultaneously. Similarly, as-
sessing the eﬀects of other individual characteristics, such as age or education,
is also complicated by the fact that these may aﬀect outcomes not only through
the Pareto weight but also through their eﬀects on preferences.5
2.2 Empirical approaches
There has been a substantial focus on testing the unitary model in empirical stud-
ies on intra-household bargaining. Especially income pooling has been frequently
tested (and rejected) (Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Browning, Bourguignon, Chi-
appori, and Lechene 1994; Browning 1995; Donni 2007; Duﬂo 2000; Ermisch and
Pronzato 2006; Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Lundberg,
5Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) show that if each partner is the exclusive consumer of at
least one commodity, one can uniquely recover individual preferences and the Pareto weight
up to the cardinalization. Yet, as a full discussion of various conditions for identiﬁcation is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper, the interested reader may want to consult Browning,
Chiappori, and Weiss (2007) and the references therein for further details.
5Pollak, and Wales 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990;
Ward-Batts 2003). Given the usual rejections of the unitary model, the empiri-
cal literature has investigated the role of the bargaining processes, i.e. eﬀects of
changes in bargaining power, on a large number of diﬀerent household outcomes.
Examples include the well-being of children and the resources devoted to them
(Kooreman 2000; Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Thomas 1990),
fertility decisions and contraceptive use (Beegle et al. 2001; Duﬂo 2003; Schuler
and Hashemi 1994; Schultz 1990), ﬁnancial decision-making and savings behavior
(Browning 1995; Alessie et al. 2006; Lundberg et al. 2003), charitable giving and
informal care-giving (Andreoni et al. 2003; Pezzin and Steinberg Schone 1999).
These studies exploit shifts in distribution factors, usually individual incomes, to
assess the eﬀects of shifts in bargaining power on household outcomes.6
Among these, we would like to highlight Attanasio and Lechene (2002) who also
analyze subjective assessments using Mexican data. They exploit the random as-
signment in the PROGRESA program which gives monetary and in-kind transfers
to women.7 The study explores the eﬀect of these exogenous income transfers on
the self-reported decision weight of women in a number of important expenditure
decisions, such as health and education decisions of the children and house ex-
penditures. The authors ﬁnd that the transfers usually increase women’s weight
in these decisions. In a second step, they analyze the impact of the transfer on
the expenditure patterns of households. The data rejects the unitary model.
Another related study is Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas (2001) which takes
a more comprehensive approach at modeling bargaining power. They use four
potential indicators of power instead of just a shift in individual control over re-
sources to study the eﬀect of household bargaining on the use of prenatal health
care. In addition to individual asset ownership, they include factors like educa-
tion of the partners as well as social status and education of the parents. They
ﬁnd that higher indicators for the female relative to the male partner lead to
better prenatal care. The authors conclude that "a woman’s bargaining power
is not suitably summarized by a single indicator but spans multiple dimensions
of a couple’s life, including both economic and social aspects of their marriage"
(p.143).
Since all of the above studies solely focus on the role of household decision pro-
cesses in determining outcomes, they do not provide a comprehensive assessment
of the distribution of decision power as such nor on its underlying determinants.
The only study of the determinants of power is, to our knowledge, Friedberg and
Webb (2006). They analyze the allocation of decision power as well as its deter-
minants using a subjective assessment from the 1992 wave of the US Health and
6As mentioned earlier, the use of distribution factors is ideal for assessing the eﬀects of
power on outcomes, as these have - by deﬁnition - no eﬀects on preferences or the budget set
and therefore allow to disentangle power from potentially confounding eﬀects of changes in
preferences or budget sets
7These transfers are meant to foster education, nutrition and health.
6Retirement Survey (HRS). Speciﬁcally, their survey instruments reads: "When
it comes to making major family decisions, who has the ﬁnal say—you or your
(husband/ wife/ partner)? By "major family decisions" we mean things like when
to retire, where to live, or how much money to spend on a major purchase.". Es-
timating a parametric bivariate probit model, they ﬁnd labor market earnings
to have a signiﬁcantly positive but moderate eﬀect on decision power. Other
determinants of decision power found in this analysis are education and self-
employment. Cognition, health and parents’ education are found to have minor
eﬀects on bargaining power.
The above HRS question used in their study may at ﬁrst appear identical to the
MHAS one that we are going to exploit, though a closer look reveals an impor-
tant diﬀerence between the two survey instruments. While the HRS question is
framed towards speciﬁc areas of decision-making, the one of the MHAS is deliber-
ately general. As a consequence, Friedberg and Webb (2006) most likely consider
a composite measure of (general) decision power and item-speciﬁc preferences
(over retirement, residence or major purchases), while analyzing the MHAS mea-
sure should lead to a non-confounded assessment of decision power in general.
3 Data
We use data from the 2003 wave of the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHAS).
The MHAS is a nationally representative sample of the noninstitutionalized Mex-
ican population aged 50+ and their partners. The survey is similar in its design
and topics to the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). It contains extensive
information on family and social relations, demographics, and health status as
well as childhood conditions, intergenerational transfers, income and wealth, liv-
ing conditions and anthropometric measures. We restrict the sample to couple
households, which leaves us with roughly 3500 couples.
The measure of decision power
Among the measures of family relations is our survey instrument, a self-assessment
of each partner’s decision power in the household. The question asked is: "When
making important family decisions, who has more weight in the decision—you or
your spouse?" As a follow-up, those respondents who stated that they or their
partner had more say were asked: "Would you say that you/your spouse have/has
much more say in decision-making or somewhat more?" We combine the infor-
mation from the aforementioned two questions on say in family decisions and
deﬁne our measure of self-assessed decision power to be a discrete variable taking
on ﬁve possible values: 1 meaning that the female partner has much more say
in the household and 5 being the other extreme that the male partner has much
more say.8
8The complete coding of the variable is: 1=female partner has much more say, 2=female
7As mentioned previously, one important feature of this question is that it is not
framed or targeted to any speciﬁc decision. We therefore expect the answers to
be unconfounded by individual preferences, just capturing actual decision power.
It is this unique feature of our survey instrument that allows us to interpret our
outcome variable as a general measure of overall decision power.
Both partners are asked separately about their assessment of decision power.
Interviewers are asked to ensure the privacy of the respondent and they are sup-
posed to stress the conﬁdentiality of the questions and to ask any other person
but the respondent to move to another room (INEGI 2003). Table 1 shows the
distribution of intra-household decision power according to male and female self-
assessments. The most salient observation is the high concentration of households
stating that they have equal say which ranges above 57 per cent independent of
who answers. As expected, male partners tend to have more say than female
partners. In about 30% respectively 28% of couples, the male partner has more
say, according to the male and female partners’ assessments, respectively.
Table 1 here
Our measure is subjective and may thus be an error-ridden proxy for the true
allocation of decision power within the couple. Table 2 illustrates agreements and
disagreements of partners by taking the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
assessments. More than 57 per cent of couples agree perfectly in their assessments
and 79 per cent agree perfectly or almost perfectly. Strong disagreements, i.e.
situations in which both partners think they (or their partner) have (much) more
decision power, are seldom, and occur only in 3.5% of the cases. A closer look
at the disagreements reveals that in these cases, the respondents generally report
to have more decision power than granted to them by their respective partner.
Hence, a relative overstatement of one’s own power, seems to be the main cause
for disagreement. Nonetheless, we view the general consistency of answers across
partners as comforting evidence regarding the reliability of our survey instrument.
Table 2 here
One way to interpret the existing diﬀerences in partners’ assessments would
be to attribute them to classical measurement error.9 Alternatively, such report-
ing diﬀerences may be due to gender-speciﬁc reporting styles and thus feature
systematic over- or underreporting by gender. In our analysis, we take these in-
terpretations into account.
partner has somewhat more say, 3=equal say, 4=male partner has somewhat more say, 5=male
partner has much more say.
9This approach is for example taken by Friedberg and Webb (2006).
8Explanatory Variables
We relate the above self-assessments of decision power to several demographic,
socioeconomic and health characteristics of the two partners to assess their re-
spective impact on the allocation of power within the couple. Speciﬁcally, the
characteristics included in each partner’s bargaining power index are: age and
age squared, household wealth and household wealth squared, individual income
and income squared, years of education, work status, and health variables, i.e.
dummy variables capturing the existence of mobility limitations, any problems
with activities of daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of daily living
(IADLs). ADLs are activities related to personal care and include bathing, show-
ering, dressing, getting in or out of bed or a chair, using the toilet and eating,
while IADLs relate to independent living and include preparing meals, shopping
for groceries or personal items, performing housework, and using a telephone.
Finally, the indices include two dummies classifying the level of urbanity of the
area in which the household is situated. Table 3 presents basic summary statis-




Economic theory and empirical studies to date do not give much guidance on what
the determinants of decision power are nor how they aﬀect the balance of power.
In our analysis of the determinants of decision power, we thus include a rich set of
potentially important individual and household characteristics. Particularly, we
assume that each partner is endowed with some latent level of bargaining power,
which can be modeled as a linear combination of this large set of demographic,
socioeconomic and health characteristics. Decision power is then determined by
the potentially complex interplay of the two bargaining power indices.
Our modelling approach has the particular advantage that it allows us to re-
duce the dimensionality of the empirical model by aggregating the determinants
of individual decision power into just two distinct indices, one for each partner.
Given this double index structure, we can model any interactions between the
two indices fully nonparametrically without facing the well-known curse of di-
mensionality. As such, our model can easily accommodate complex interactions
of the partners’ characteristics as well as contextual distribution factors that may
inﬂuence the allocation of decision power within the couple.

























denotes a parameter of interest, such as a condi-
tional probability or conditional expectation function, related to the self-reported
measure of bargaining power Yi, while XM
i ¯M and XF
i ¯F denote the indices of
the male and female partner in couple i. g(¢;¢) in turn denotes a bivariate non-
parametric mapping of the two indices into self-reported decision power. Be-
ing nonparametric, the mapping g(¢;¢) allows for potential non-linearities, non-
monotonicities as well as fully ﬂexible interactions between the two indices in
determining Yi. From an ex ante perspective, all of these features may be po-
tentially important. While higher levels of bargaining power seem instrumental
for generating more say in the household, the realized allocation of power will
most likely depend on the bargaining power of the partner as well. At the same
time, just looking at relative bargaining power may be oversimplifying. Thanks
to larger opportunity sets, female partners with higher levels of bargaining power
may, for example, be able to enforce equal say largely irrespective of their part-
ners’ characteristics, whereas less advantaged women may be vulnerable to less
favorable allocations of power due to their lack of outside options. Additionally,
attitudes may also diﬀer across socioeconomic strata and gender, with some strata
regarding gender equality as a value per se that does not require any back-up in
terms of high and/or equal bargaining power of the respective partner. In an
exploratory investigation like the one considered here, it seems thus prudent to
advance a "local" nonparametric estimation strategy that can incorporate all of
the above considerations.
4.2 Conditional expectations
Using the generic modelling framework outlined above, we estimate four diﬀerent
empirical speciﬁcations, some of which require a further specialization of (3). For
primary analysis, we treat the partners’ self-assessments as cardinal measures
of decision power (possibly subject to classical measurement error, e.g. in the
case of disagreements) and take the average of both partners’ assessments as
our dependent variable Yi. Treating Yi as a cardinal continuous measure10, we
can estimate a standard semiparametric double index model for the conditional
expectations of Yi given the indices XM
i ¯M and XF






Estimates for the index coeﬃcients c ¯M and c ¯F are thereby obtained by applying
the semiparametric least squares procedure of Ichimura and Lee (1991), i.e. as
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denotes the predicted value from a bivariate nonpara-
metric regression of Yi on two candidate indices XM
i ¯M and XF
i ¯F respectively.
10All of these assumptions are obviously fairly restrictive and will be further elaborated on
in due course.
10Thus, b E [¢j¢;¢] takes the place of the nonparametric link function. Although the
assumptions of cardinality, continuity and classical measurement error are far
from innocuous, we consider our initial model as useful benchmark for a ﬁrst
exploratory investigation of the main relationships between decision power and
the sociodemographic characteristics of the partners.
4.3 Ordered response models
To check the robustness of our initial ﬁndings with respect to a more stringent
sample selection as well as an more accurate ordinal interpretation of the decision
power self-reports, we perform further regression analysis using more reﬁned em-
pirical models. Firstly, we restrict our estimation sample to those couples where
both partners agree on the distribution of say within the household. The main
aim of this sample selection is to alleviate the potential impact of measurement
error that plagues conﬂicting assessments across partners. A second strategy for
dealing with conﬂicting assessments is to allow for gender-speciﬁc reporting styles
and analyze the assessments of male and female partners separately. Both strate-
gies have the additional advantage that we can interpret our generated decision
power variable as an ordinal outcome measured on its original ﬁve point scale
and estimate conditional probabilities for each of its potential realizations.11
To account for the ordinal nature of Yi, we estimate a semiparametric double in-
dex ordered response model adapting the estimators of Klein and Spady (1993),
Klein and Sherman (2002) and Klein and Vella (2006) respectively. Considering
two consecutive outcomes j ¡ 1 and j with j 2 f1;2;3;4;5g of the self-reported













































can thus be conveniently
analyzed by estimating conditional probabilities of binary events of the form
fYi > jg, which can then be stacked to obtain a quasi-likelihood function for the
underlying ordered response model. We estimate the index coeﬃcients c ¯M and
c ¯F by maximizing the thus constructed quasi-likelihood function over ¯M and
¯F, i.e. as
³










11Our initial analysis requires averaging of the two assessments across partners and thus
implies a cardinal interpretation of Yi, which is then also reﬂected in our modelling strategy


























In this setup, the conditional probability functions b P (¢j¢;¢) are estimated non-
parametrically and thus take the place of the nonparametric link function g(¢;¢)
of the generic framework.
5 Results
Using the above modelling strategies, we obtain three sets of results pertaining to
the analysis of averaged assessments, agreements, and gender- speciﬁc reports re-
spectively. For each set of results, we present our ﬁndings in three steps. Firstly,
we discuss how the partners’ sociodemographic characteristics aggregate into our
bargaining power indices. These estimation results reveal the trade-oﬀ between
diﬀerent characteristics of the partners with respect to the allocation of decision
power in the couple and allow us to assess which of these enter the bargain-
ing power indices statistically signiﬁcantly. Yet, the indices can of course only
be interpreted in connection with the nonparametric link function, which maps
them into the individual assessments of decision power. Hence, we plot this link
function, thus showing the link between the diﬀerent combinations of the gender-
speciﬁc indices and the intra-household allocations of power. Finally, we present
estimations for the overall eﬀect of a change in each individual or household char-
acteristic on the allocation of decision power, as mediated through both the index
aggregation as well as the nonparametric link function. Speciﬁcally, we compute
average partial eﬀects (APE), where we keep all characteristics but one at their
actual values and vary only the respective variable of interest. The exact variable
changes that we use to compute the APE are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 about here
5.1 Conditional expectations: Average assessments
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation treats the assessments of both partners as cardinal vari-
ables, potentially subject to (classical) measurement error. Under these assump-
tion, we can average the partners’ reports and use the resulting couple-speciﬁc
mean assessment as outcome of interest.
While the eﬀect of each of the partners’ characteristics on the balance of power
will be discussed later using the APE (see Table 6), we ﬁrst present the param-
eter estimates for the two bargaining power indices in Table 5. The estimations
12show that individual income, education and working for pay increase the values
of both partners’ indices, while poor health tends to lead to lower index levels
(with the only exception of the fairly prevalent mobility limitations of women).
The eﬀects of age on the indices are non-monotonic, though increasing over most
of the relevant age range. Finally, living in more rural areas increases the in-
dex for male partners. Female partners feature lower index values in rural areas
and medium size cities compared to big cities, but the estimated eﬀects are not
monotonic. In this regard, it is, however, important to note that city size is a
couple-level variable whose eﬀects can thus only be assessed by varying its values
for both partners simultaneously, which makes its interpretation somewhat less
straightforward.
Regrettably, the precision of the resulting estimates is somewhat disappointing.
Particularly, the index coeﬃcients for the male partners are estimated very im-
precisely and appear statistically insigniﬁcant throughout, with the exception of
the nonlinear eﬀects of age. For the female partners’ characteristics, however, we
obtain signiﬁcant estimates for the eﬀects of education, labor market status and
degree of urbanity, beyond the nonlinearities in age already documented for men.
Overall, the relative signs and sizes of the estimates are by and large in line with
prior expectations, even if estimated relatively imprecisely, at least for the male
partners.
Table 5 about here
In the next step, we investigate how the estimated indices map into actual
allocations of decision power and whether the resulting estimate of the nonpara-
metric link function does in fact provide support for our interpretation of the
estimated indices as measures of bargain power. Panel a of Figure 1 shows the
joint density of the two indices to establish the relevant support of the data. The
red curves depict the combinations of male and female index values that appear
most frequently in the data, blue and black lines depict still high, but decreasing
frequency. Frequent combinations of male and female partners’ index values lie
roughly in the interval [0.2,0.85] for the male and [0.18,0.5] for the female index.
As nonparametric methods do not allow for oﬀ-support predictions, we show the
nonparametric link function only for areas within these intervals (depicted by the
black square).12
Panel b of Figure 1 presents our estimate for the link function. The red area
in Figure 1b depicts index combinations that render the highest value of male
decision power. Blue lines represent lower values of the estimated conditional ex-
pectations function while black represents the lowest estimates, i.e. the outcomes
that are most favorable for female partners.
12The same procedure will be applied in the other two speciﬁcations.
13Figure 1 about here
As expected, decision power is generally somewhat skewed towards more say
of male partners, since the estimated values for the conditional expectations func-
tion are larger than three for most of the support.
Beyond the general tendency towards more say of men, expected decision power
displays considerable gradients with respect to the estimated indices which sup-
port our interpretation as bargaining power indices. Particularly, for given index
values of the male partner, decision power of the female partner is increasing in
her own index values. A similar pattern emerges for male partners. For given
index values of the female partner, expected decision power of men is usually
increasing in their own index values, again supporting an interpretation of the
estimated indices as measures of bargaining power. Furthermore, the eﬀects of in-
creasing index values for male and female partners seem to be largely oﬀ-setting.
Speciﬁcally, decision power seems to be largely unaﬀected, when we consider
changes in both indices along their joint distribution. While these general pat-
terns are largely in line with the (common) idea that it is the relative standing
of the two partners that is driving the ﬁnal allocation of say, we also ﬁnd some
interesting evidence for important asymmetries and non-monotonicities, which
would have been hard to unravel in a standard parametric framework. Particu-
larly, we ﬁnd that for lower index values of the female partner, decision power of
the male partner is ﬁrst increasing, but then decreasing in the man’s index. It
thus appears that the gender asymmetries in decision power are at their highest
in couples where the woman features a low and the man a medium index level.
Even higher index values of the male partner do then lead to somewhat more
equality in say, suggesting changing gender attitudes towards the upper tail of its
distribution. Hence, while we ﬁnd that the relative standing of the partners plays
the major role in determining the allocation of power within the couple, we also
discover some more complex gradients of decision power across the index distri-
bution, which seem diﬃcult to capture in more restricted frameworks focussing
on relative eﬀects only.
Table 6 about here
Given our estimates of the index coeﬃcients and the link function, we can as-
sess how changes in the underlying characteristics of the partners lead to diﬀerent
allocations of say. Speciﬁcally, we can compute average partial eﬀects (APE) that
summarize the total eﬀect of a variable change as mediated by both the index
shift and its associated mapping into expected decision power.
The ﬁrst column in Table 6 presents probability changes if only the male part-
ner’s characteristics are changed. Column two reports the impact of changes of
the female partner’s characteristics accordingly, while simultaneous changes in
the characteristics of both partners are considered in the last column of Table 6.
14Reﬂecting the estimated index coeﬃcients and the nature of the nonparametric
link function, the APE for each individual set of variables can be summarized as
follows:
1. Higher age is associated with higher decision power of the respective part-
ner.
2. Higher individual income leads to higher decision power of the respective
partner earning it. This corresponds to the notion in the empirical literature
that control over ﬁnancial resources is a major determinant of bargaining
power.
3. Higher educational attainment increases the respective partners’ decision
power.
4. Labor force participation enhances one’s power.
5. The positive eﬀects of education and working for pay on women’s outcomes
persist if we consider comparable changes for both partners simultaneously.
Thus, a couple with two highly educated working partners tends to feature
relatively more decision power for the female partner than a couple with
two low educated partners neither of whom is working.
6. Being in bad health decreases decision power.
7. Richer households feature relatively more decision power of the male part-
ner.
8. Rural areas feature more traditional gender role outcomes with higher de-
cision power of men.
Yet, it bears repeating that some of the above characteristics do not enter the
respective indices statistically signiﬁcantly, especially for the male partner. In
sum, it appears that based on our initial model, educational attainment and
labor market status stand out as the key individual-level determinants of bar-
gaining power, with some additional contextual inﬂuences related to the size of
the couple’s city of residence. Apart from being comparatively large, these eﬀects
are also statistically signiﬁcant, at least for the female partner.
5.2 Ordered responses: Agreements and gender-speciﬁc re-
ports
While the results of our initial analysis based on a cardinal interpretation of the
self-reports are easily interpretable and thus useful as a benchmark, the econo-
metric model may be seen as overly restrictive. Firstly, the construction of the
15outcome variable as an average of the two assessments does not reﬂect the or-
dinal nature of our survey instruments. While representing a convenient way to
combine both partners’ assessment on the same outcome, the averaging is based
on a somewhat arbitrary metric. This hinders a straightforward interpretation
of our estimation results in terms of the original (ordinal) statements stemming
from the survey question. Secondly, even conditional on a cardinal interpretation
of the survey measure, our initial results hinge upon the additional assumption
that measurement and reporting errors are random. There might be good rea-
sons why this assumption is not warranted. Particularly, disagreements between
partners could also be explained by gender-speciﬁc reporting styles, which often
plague self-reported survey data (Lee and Waite 2005).
We therefore advance two alternative empirical models to address the robustness
of our ﬁndings to both an ordinal interpretation of the survey instrument as well
as potential gender-speciﬁc reporting styles. Firstly, we restrict our analysis to
couples with non-conﬂicting assessments of decision power, deleting all disagree-
ments from our estimation sample. This strategy takes each partners assessment
at face value and does not require any aggregation of the partners assessments.
Hence, we do not require a cardinal interpretation of our survey measure, but can
instead estimate a semiparametric double index model for ordered responses that
fully reﬂects the ordinal nature of our survey instrument. Our second robustness
check fully accounts for the potential existence of gender-speciﬁc reporting styles
by analyzing male and female assessments separately. Again, separate analysis
by gender does not require any aggregation of outcomes and thus allows us to use
the more appropriate ordered response model. Beyond checking the robustness
of our initial ﬁndings, we would also expect to obtain improved precision in the
resulting estimates based on a more rigorous interpretation of our survey instru-
ment.
Agreements
Restricting the sample to couples with non-conﬂicting assessments of say leads
to very similar results as our initial analysis based on average assessments. Table
7 presents the corresponding estimates for the index coeﬃcients while Figures 2a
through f plot the nonparametric link functions for the conditional probabilities
of every outcome. The relative sizes of the index coeﬃcients seem largely in line
with our previous estimates. Also, the shape of the probability plots is largely
comparable with the evidence presented before, particularly as the graphs feature
the same non-monotonicity in the male partner’s index that we had documented
earlier.
Table 7 about here
Figure 2 about here
Table 8 about here
16To summarize the entire relationship between the partners’ characteristics
and each possible outcome, we can again compute average partial eﬀects for each
set of variables, as presented in Table 8. The estimations indicate strong eﬀects
of employment status and education, especially for female partners. In this con-
text, it is also worth noting that both employment status and education enter the
two bargaining power indices statistically signiﬁcantly. Whilst male labor force
participation boosts his decision power, female labor force participation increases
the probability of equal say by about as much as it decreases the probability that
he has much more say. We ﬁnd a similar eﬀect for educational attainment: While
a higher education level generally increases the decision power of the respective
partner, the eﬀect is much stronger for women. The estimated gender-asymmetry
of the eﬀects of both work status and education have therefore important implica-
tions for gender empowerment. Particularly, comparable simultaneous changes of
both partners characteristics generally leads to an improvement of the situation
of the female partner, characterized by a shift towards a more equal distribution
of decision power within the couple.
Beyond employment status and education, health appears to also play an im-
portant role in determining decision power. Worse health is generally associated
with less decision power of the ill person, though the associated index coeﬃcients
are only statistically signiﬁcant for the male partners. Finally, living in more
rural areas also increases the say of the male partner substantially, and some of
the associated index coeﬃcients enter the model statistically signiﬁcantly.
In sum, we ﬁnd that our analysis based on agreements largely conﬁrms the ﬁnd-
ings of our initial estimates. Employment status, education and health status
are the most important individual-level determinants of decision power in the
couple. Moreover, we also ﬁnd some indication for important contextual eﬀects
as proxied by the size of the couple’s city of residence.
In the next subsections, we take into account that men and women may have
diﬀerent reporting styles and analyze male and female reports separately.
Gender-speciﬁc analysis: Male partners’ assessments
Table 9 presents the estimated index coeﬃcients analyzing male assessments only.
Again, the relative contributions of our control variables are pretty much in line
with earlier results. Yet, our gender-speciﬁc analysis results in a remarkable in-
crease in statistical precision, such that almost all of our control variables enter
the model statistically signiﬁcantly, some even at the 1% level.
The nonparametric link functions in Figures 3b through 3f again illustrate the
probabilities for each of the ﬁve outcome possibilities conditional on the index
values of the two partners. The link functions are also in line with the previous
ﬁndings. Apart from highlighting the generally positive dependence between the
partners’ index values and decision power, they again feature the previously doc-
umented non-monotonicity of say in the male partner’s index, conditional on low




Now, we turn to the discussion of the characteristics contained in the respec-
tive indices, and their quantitative impact on the balance of power within the
household. Table 10 indicates that a partner’s decision power increases with his
or her age, income, education, labor force participation and health status. Among
these individual characteristics, education, employment status and health have
once again the largest eﬀects. Also, the estimated eﬀects of education remain
asymmetric across gender, indicating that simultaneous improvements in edu-
cational attainment for both, male and female partners, are generally associated
with a more equal distribution of say in the couple. On the other hand, we do not
ﬁnd such asymmetries for employment status. While we estimate large beneﬁcial
eﬀects of active labor market participation for both partners, these tend to be
largely oﬀsetting when changing their labor market status simultaneously. The
eﬀects of health, however, are again fairly asymmetric, indicating that adverse
health events tend to lead to a more severe loss of power for male than female
partners. Finally, while household wealth does not display any clear-cut eﬀect on
the distribution of power, we once more ﬁnd a strong tendency for more say of
the male partner in more rural areas.
Gender-speciﬁc analysis: Female partners’ assessments
Our last robustness check focusses on the self-assessments of female partners, thus
judging the eﬀects of our control variables subject to female reporting styles. Ta-
ble 11 presents the associated parameter estimates for the two gender-speciﬁc
indices, while Figures 4a to f present the estimated link functions mapping the
two indices into actual outcome probabilities.
Table 11 here
Figure 4 here
While we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects for most female characteristics,
none of the coeﬃcient estimates of the man’s index enter the model statistically
signiﬁcantly. It thus seems that women’s perception of their decision power re-
lates more to their own characteristics. Regarding the point estimates, however,
the results are similar to the previous ones. As highlighted by our partial eﬀect
estimates, education, employment and health status, as well as the living area are
the main driving forces underlying the allocation of decision power in the couple.
Moreover, their respective eﬀects are generally stronger for female partners, such
that simultaneous improvements in individual characteristics still tend to lead to




We ﬁnd the same key determinants of decision power in all three speciﬁcations.
Also, the estimates are more pronounced and more precisely estimated for female
partners, indicating that their characteristics feature a more clear-cut relation-
ship with self-assessed decision power.
The main driving forces of decision power are education and work status and to
a lesser extent health status and individual income. Moreover, we often ﬁnd that
individual characteristics aﬀect decision power of the partners asymmetrically in
terms of their magnitude, with stronger positive eﬀects for female partners. As a
consequence, improving the characteristics of both partners is not perfectly oﬀ-
setting, but leads to a more equal distribution of say within the couple. Finally,
we generally ﬁnd that more urban couples have a more equal distribution of say,
indicating an important role for contextual eﬀects such as more traditional gen-
der roles in rural areas.
The nonparametric link functions from all of the above estimations feature fairly
similar patterns. Increasing index values are generally associated with higher lev-
els of say for the respective partner, apart from the documented non-monotonicity
in the male partners’ index conditional on low index values for the female partner.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we recompute the indices of all four models for the
entire sample and assess the correlation of the indices across models. Since our
estimations are not constrained to identical index aggregation, a large degree of
correspondence between the individual index values across all models would un-
derline the robustness of our results. Table 13 shows that the estimated indices
are highly correlated across models, indicating that all four estimations lead to
fairly similar conclusions regarding the relative importance of diﬀerent individ-
ual, household and societal characteristics in forming the indices. Particularly,
the correlation of the gender-speciﬁc indices is always above .6 and most of the
time above .75.
Table 13 about here
6 Conclusion
Decision processes among couples depend on the balance of power between the
partners which is one of the factors determining the individual welfare of house-
hold members as well as household outcomes. A better understanding of its
19driving forces is therefore an essential prerequisite for the advancement of suc-
cessful policies aimed at intra-household equality and gender empowerment.
Based on the Mexican Health and Aging Study, we exploit a unique measure of
decision power within the household to analyze the impact of various individual,
household and social characteristics on its distribution. On average, this measure
of power points to somewhat more say of the male partner in the couple.
We analyze the determinants of self-assessed decision power within a ﬂexible
semiparametric modeling framework, featuring two indices that contain numerous
characteristics of each partner. Our ﬁndings point to fairly complex relationships
between both partners’ demographic, socioeconomic and health characteristics
on the one hand and decision power on the other. Especially gender-asymmetries
and non-monotonicities appear to be important features of the relationships the
individual characteristics of each partner on the one hand and decision power on
the other.
We identify education and employment status as key individual-level character-
istics aﬀecting the balance of power. Higher educational attainment and active
labor market participation aﬀect both partners’ decision power positively. We
document some important asymmetries in the eﬀect of male and female edu-
cation on decision power. While a higher education level increases the male
partner’s decision power only moderately, the increase in the female partner’s de-
cision power is large if she features relatively high educational attainment. More
generally, couples where both partners have relatively high levels of bargaining
power also tend to feature a more equal distribution of say within the household.
Moreover, we are also able to document some evidence for positive eﬀects of good
health on decision power, although this ﬁnding is somewhat less clear-cut. Par-
ticularly, poor health seems to lead to a loss of power of the male partner, while
we do not ﬁnd any corresponding eﬀects for the female counterpart.
Finally, rural couples generally feature a less equal distribution of power than
otherwise similar couples in urban areas, pointing to important eﬀects of the
social environment in the determination of say within the household.
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Appendix A1: Figures
Figure 1: Averaged assessments: bivariate densities and probabilities conditional
on male and female indices
(a) (b)
Bivariate density estimates Expected decision weight
Note: The x-axis depicts the index of the man, the y-axis the index of the woman
23Figure 2: Agreements: bivariate densities and probabilities conditional on male
and female indices
(a) (b)
Bivariate density estimates Probability for much more say woman
(c) (d)
Probability for more say woman Probability for equal say
(e) (f)
Probability for more say man Probability for much more say man
Note: The x-axis depicts the index of the man, the y-axis the index of the woman
24Figure 3: Male Assessments: bivariate densities and probabilities conditional on
male and female indices
(a) (b)
Bivariate density estimates Probability for much more say woman
(c) (d)
Probability for more say woman Probability for equal say
(e) (f)
Probability for more say man Probability for much more say man
Note: The x-axis depicts the index of the man, the y-axis the index of the woman
25Figure 4: Female Assessments: bivariate densities and probabilities conditional
on male and female indices
(a) (b)




Probability for more say woman Probability for equal say
(e) (f)
Probability for more say man Probability for much more say man
Note: The x-axis depicts the index of the man, the y-axis the index of the woman
26Appendix A2: Tables
Table 1: Partners’ self-reported decision power
Men Women Both
Decision Index Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
1 118 3.34 302 8.52 420 5.93
2 125 3.54 234 6.61 359 5.07
3 2,227 63.00 2,031 57.32 4,258 60.16
4 486 13.75 422 11.91 908 12.83
5 579 16.38 554 15.64 1,133 16.01
Total 3,535 100.00 3,543 100.00 7,078 100.00
1=she has much more say, 2=she has somewhat more say, 3=Equal say, 4=he has somewhat
more say, 5=he has much more say
Table 2: Frequency of agreement in decision power reports
Degree of agreement Frequency Percent Cum.
Perfect agreement (0) 1,984 57.32 57.32
Minor disagreement (1) 748 21.61 78.93
Medium disagreement (2) 609 17.60 96.53
Strong disagreement (3,4) 120 3.47 100.00
Total 3,461 100.00 100.00
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Male Assessment Sample Female Assessment Sample
Variable Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Men Women Men Women
Working 0.690 0.463 0.240 0.427 0.690 0.463 0.244 0.429
Any mobility limit. 0.498 0.500 0.618 0.486 0.498 0.500 0.619 0.486
Any ADL 0.060 0.238 0.059 0.236 0.060 0.237 0.060 0.237
Any IADL 0.047 0.211 0.064 0.244 0.046 0.210 0.064 0.245
Age 63.380 8.869 58.255 9.568 63.320 8.833 58.216 9.558
Years of educ. 4.985 4.705 4.385 3.948 5.002 4.719 4.417 3.975
Indiv. income 0.441 0.661 0.246 0.524 0.441 0.659 0.246 0.521
(in 10,000 MXN)
Household Household
Net worth (in 1,000) 0.447 0.524 0.446 0.522
Medium city size 0.250 0.433 0.252 0.434
Rural area 0.186 0.389 0.184 0.388
Observations 3,535 3,543
27Table 4: Counterfactuals used to calculate partial eﬀects
Variable Low to high Men Women
Age 1st to 4th quartile 56 to 69 52 to 64
Individual Income 1st to 4th quartile 1000 to 5800 MXN 0 to 2300 MXN
Education 1st to 4th quartile 1 to 6 1 to 6
Work not working to working 0 to 1 0 to 1
Health limit. none to ADL, IADL, 0,0,0 to 1,1,1 0,0,0 to 1,1,1
mobility limit.
Household Wealth 1st to 4th quartile 111,000 to 562,804 MXN
City size urban to rural area >100,000 to <2,500 inhab.
Table 5: Averaged assessments: Parameter Estimates for the Indices
Men’s characteristics Women’s characteristics
Variable Par. SE p-Value Par. SE p-Value
Estim. Estim.
Age/102 1.0000 ——— ——— 1.0000 ——— ———
(Age/102)2) -0.6595 0.1177 0.0000 -0.7055 0.0777 0.0000
Household Wealth/106 -0.4299 0.4874 0.3778 -0.2526 0.1486 0.0892
(Household Wealth/106)2 0.1073 0.1235 0.3851 0.0679 0.0391 0.0827
Income/104 0.2634 0.3268 0.4203 0.0781 0.0597 0.1912
(Income/104)2 -0.0378 0.0535 0.4792 -0.0068 0.0103 0.5106
Years of education 0.0234 0.0236 0.3218 0.0141 0.0057 0.0140
Working 0.1284 0.1290 0.3194 0.0759 0.0310 0.0143
Any mobility limitation -0.0162 0.0199 0.4149 0.0165 0.0192 0.3922
Any ADL -0.1055 0.1711 0.5373 -0.0224 0.0211 0.2879
Any IADL -0.0107 0.0415 0.7959 -0.0364 0.0231 0.1159
Rural area 0.0680 0.0715 0.3414 -0.0214 0.0158 0.1763
Medium city size 0.0342 0.0516 0.5069 -0.0869 0.0377 0.0213
Table 6: Averaged Assessments: Average Partial Eﬀects - Absolute Changes in
Probabilities
Men Women Both
Age (Low to High) 0.0126 -0.0366 -0.0236
Individual Income (Low to High) 0.0515 -0.0296 0.0212
Education (Low to High) 0.0896 -0.1783 -0.0757
Work (no Work to Work) 0.0797 -0.1380 -0.0612
Health (Good to Bad) -0.0850 0.0631 -0.0170
Household Wealth (Low to High) ——— ——— 0.0527
City Size (Large to Small) ——— ——— 0.1566
28Table 7: Agreements: Parameter Estimates for the Indices
Men’s characteristics Women’s characteristics
Variable Par. SE p-Value Par. SE p-Value
Estim. Estim.
Age/102 1 ——— ——— 1.0000 ——— ———
(Age/102)2 -0.7696 0.0292 0.0000 -0.6900 0.0700 0.0000
Household Wealth/106 -0.0523 0.0276 0.0584 -0.0488 0.0552 0.3773
(Household Wealth/106)2 -0.0018 0.0169 0.9138 -0.0048 0.0201 0.8101
Income/104 0.0427 0.0274 0.1187 0.0144 0.0278 0.6056
(Income/104)2 -0.0040 0.0082 0.6304 -0.0020 0.0133 0.8776
Years of education 0.0028 0.0016 0.0778 0.0083 0.0043 0.0513
Working 0.0293 0.0138 0.0335 0.0641 0.0245 0.0090
Any mobility limitation -0.0212 0.0188 0.2602 -0.0176 0.0121 0.1463
Any ADL 0.0366 0.0159 0.0210 -0.0103 0.0389 0.7911
Any IADL -0.0775 0.0201 0.0001 -0.0191 0.0224 0.3943
Rural area 0.0139 0.0077 0.0720 -0.0020 0.0098 0.8423
Medium city size -0.0130 0.0200 0.5173 -0.0427 0.0178 0.0164
29Table 8: Agreements: Estimated Average Partial Eﬀects - Absolute Changes in
Probabilities
Men Women Both
Age (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0011 0.0045 0.0035
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0000 0.0005 0.0004
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0010 0.0218 0.0210
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0000 -0.0028 -0.0027
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0021 -0.0239 -0.0221
Individual Income (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0041 0.0006 -0.0034
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0008 0.0030 0.0024
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0014
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0057 -0.0032 0.0025
Education (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0037 0.0092 0.0056
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0000 0.0019 0.0020
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0008 0.0423 0.0406
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0005 -0.0095 -0.0097
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0050 -0.0439 -0.0385
Work (no Work to Work)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0085 0.0143 0.0063
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0132 0.0557 0.0478
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0041 -0.0127 -0.0107
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0182 -0.0569 -0.0427
Health (Good to Bad)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] 0.0242 -0.0087 0.0144
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0018
E[¢P(Y = 3)] 0.0355 -0.0466 0.0003
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0173 0.0065 -0.0141
E[¢P(Y = 5)] -0.0427 0.0489 -0.0024
Household Wealth (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] ——— ——— 0.0008
E[¢P(Y = 2)] ——— ——— 0.0000
E[¢P(Y = 3)] ——— ——— -0.0163
E[¢P(Y = 4)] ——— ——— 0.0020
E[¢P(Y = 5)] ——— ——— 0.0134
City Size (Large to Small)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] ——— ——— -0.0045
E[¢P(Y = 2)] ——— ——— -0.0001
E[¢P(Y = 3)] ——— ——— -0.0370
E[¢P(Y = 4)] ——— ——— 0.0015
E[¢P(Y = 5)] ——— ——— 0.0401 30Table 9: Male Assessments: Parameter Estimates for the Indices
Men’s characteristics Women’s characteristics
Par. Est. SE p-Value Par. Est. SE p-Value
Age/102 1 ——— ——— 1.0000 ——— ———
(Age/102)2 -0.7762 0.0369 0.0000 -0.7905 0.0408 0.0000
Household Wealth/106 -0.0882 0.0288 0.0022 -0.0825 0.0190 0.0000
(Household Wealth/106)2 0.0215 0.0088 0.0146 0.0212 0.0052 0.0001
Income/104 0.0609 0.0208 0.0034 0.0381 0.0097 0.0001
(Income/104)2 -0.0094 0.0038 0.0131 -0.0041 0.0020 0.0400
Years of education 0.0055 0.0014 0.0001 0.0083 0.0020 0.0000
Working 0.0577 0.0190 0.0024 0.0433 0.0107 0.0001
Any mobility limitation -0.0184 0.0107 0.0863 0.0243 0.0071 0.0006
Any ADL -0.0305 0.0175 0.0807 -0.0127 0.0148 0.3908
Any IADL -0.0403 0.0158 0.0109 -0.0089 0.0119 0.4528
Rural area 0.0712 0.0209 0.0007 0.0471 0.0137 0.0006
Medium city size 0.0420 0.0145 0.0039 -0.0014 0.0086 0.8683
# Obs. 3,535
31Table 10: Male Assessments: Estimated Average Partial Eﬀects - Absolute
Changes in Probabilities
Men Women Both
Age (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0010 0.0027 0.0017
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0008 0.0022 0.0013
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0008 0.0045 0.0040
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0011
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0018 -0.0076 -0.0059
Individual Income (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0058 0.0022 -0.0034
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0050 0.0016 -0.0032
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0038 0.0042 -0.0002
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0038 -0.0012 0.0028
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0108 -0.0069 0.0040
Education (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0077 0.0111 0.0040
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0065 0.0082 0.0029
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0037 0.0199 0.0125
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0048 -0.0057 0.0001
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0130 -0.0335 -0.0195
Work (no Work to Work)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0175 0.0138 -0.0035
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0136 0.0112 -0.0029
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0165 0.0165 0.0021
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0134 -0.0125 0.0009
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0342 -0.0289 0.0035
Health (Good to Bad)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] 0.0314 0.0006 0.0308
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0254 0.0004 0.0234
E[¢P(Y = 3)] 0.0024 0.0017 0.0153
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0159 -0.0001 -0.0174
E[¢P(Y = 5)] -0.0433 -0.0025 -0.0521
Household Wealth (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] ——— ——— 0.0001
E[¢P(Y = 2)] ——— ——— 0.0011
E[¢P(Y = 3)] ——— ——— -0.0082
E[¢P(Y = 4)] ——— ——— -0.0007
E[¢P(Y = 5)] ——— ——— 0.0077
City Size (Large to Small)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] ——— ——— -0.0108
E[¢P(Y = 2)] ——— ——— -0.0091
E[¢P(Y = 3)] ——— ——— -0.0125
E[¢P(Y = 4)] ——— ——— 0.0068
E[¢P(Y = 5)] ——— ——— 0.0257
32Table 11: Female Assessments: Parameter Estimates for the Indices
Men’s characteristics Women’s characteristics
Par. Est. SE p-Value Par. Est. SE p-Value
Age/102 1.0000 ——— ——— 1.0000 ——— ———
(Age/102)2 -1.3240 0.9796 0.1765 -0.8884 0.0369 0.0000
Household Wealth/102 -0.2869 0.4897 0.5579 -0.1533 0.0515 0.0029
(Household Wealth/102)2 0.0537 0.0951 0.5726 0.0286 0.0142 0.0445
Income/104 0.1351 0.2319 0.5603 0.0451 0.0224 0.0443
(Income/104)2 -0.0054 0.0177 0.7619 -0.0052 0.0062 0.3999
Years of education 0.0349 0.0598 0.5590 0.0139 0.0044 0.0016
Working -0.0369 0.0680 0.5872 0.0601 0.0204 0.0032
Any mobility limitation 0.1077 0.1868 0.5643 -0.0180 0.0085 0.0351
Any ADL -0.1139 0.1991 0.5674 0.0129 0.0131 0.3258
Any IADL -0.1799 0.3140 0.5666 0.0119 0.0121 0.3263
Rural area 0.0686 0.1220 0.5742 -0.0167 0.0107 0.1175
Medium city size 0.0268 0.0593 0.6509 -0.0585 0.0213 0.0060
# Obs. 3,543
33Table 12: Female Assessments: Estimated Average Partial Eﬀects - Absolute
Changes in Probabilities
Men Women Both
Age (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] 0.0109 -0.0010 0.0104
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0021 -0.0006 0.0015
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0013
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0013 0.0008 -0.0006
E[¢P(Y = 5)] -0.0112 0.0015 -0.0099
Individual Income (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0069 0.0035 -0.0032
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0012 0.0021 0.0008
E[¢P(Y = 3)] 0.0010 0.0024 0.0032
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0017
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0061 -0.0054 0.0008
Education (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] -0.0253 0.0330 0.0103
E[¢P(Y = 2)] -0.0008 0.0165 0.0142
E[¢P(Y = 3)] 0.0023 0.0219 0.0240
E[¢P(Y = 4)] 0.0002 -0.0249 -0.0245
E[¢P(Y = 5)] 0.0236 -0.0465 -0.0241
Work (no Work to Work)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] 0.0048 0.0260 0.0307
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0010 0.0138 0.0148
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0005 0.0162 0.0153
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0008 -0.0207 -0.0214
E[¢P(Y = 5)] -0.0045 -0.0353 -0.0394
Health (Good to Bad)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] 0.0359 -0.0003 0.0355
E[¢P(Y = 2)] 0.0105 -0.0002 0.0095
E[¢P(Y = 3)] -0.0289 -0.0002 -0.0312
E[¢P(Y = 4)] -0.0119 0.0003 -0.0105
E[¢P(Y = 5)] -0.0056 0.0005 -0.0033
Household Wealth (Low to High)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] ——— ——— -0.0053
E[¢P(Y = 2)] ——— ——— -0.0084
E[¢P(Y = 3)] ——— ——— -0.0169
E[¢P(Y = 4)] ——— ——— 0.0133
E[¢P(Y = 5)] ——— ——— 0.0174
City Size (Large to Small)
E[¢P(Y = 1)] ——— ——— -0.0217
E[¢P(Y = 2)] ——— ——— -0.0117
E[¢P(Y = 3)] ——— ——— -0.0114
E[¢P(Y = 4)] ——— ——— 0.0136
E[¢P(Y = 5)] ——— ——— 0.0312
34Table 13: Correlation of the indices across estimations
Male Partner’s Index
Pooled Agreements Male Assessment Female Assessment
Pooled 1.00 0.78 0.85 0.81
Agreements 1.00 0.79 0.63
Male Assessment 1.00 0.63
Female Assessment 1.00
Female Partner’s Index
Pooled Agreements Male Assessment Female Assessment
Pooled 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.91
Agreements 1.00 0.74 0.88
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